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Abstract
The radical skeptic argues that I have no knowledge of things I ordinarily claim to 
know because I have no evidence for or against the possibility of being systematically 
fed illusions. Recent years have seen a surge of interest in pragmatic responses to skep-
ticism inspired by C.S. Peirce. This essay challenges one such influential response and 
presents a better Peircean way to refute the skeptic. The account I develop holds that 
although I do not know whether the skeptical hypothesis is true, I still know things 
I ordinarily claim to know. It will emerge that although this reply appears similar to 
a classic contextualist response to radical skepticism, it avoids two central problems 
facing that response.
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1 Introduction
The radical skeptic argues that I have no knowledge of things I ordinarily claim 
to know because my lived experiences are indistinguishable from the hypo-
thetical scenario that I am merely being fed the impression of having those 
experiences. On this hypothesis, I have no evidence for or against the possibil-
ity of being fed the illusion that, for instance, I have two hands. Hence, I do not 
know that I have two hands—or even fingers, toes, and so forth.
Recent years have seen a surge of interest in pragmatic responses to skep-
ticism inspired by C.S. Peirce.1 Peirce’s pragmatic theory of inquiry and his 
1 See Friedman (1999); Olsson (2005a), (2005b); Hookway (2008).
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 trenchant criticism of Cartesian doubt are familiar even to those who are 
faintly acquainted with American pragmatism. This essay first explores 
Erick Olsson’s influential Peircean response to the radical skeptic. Olsson ar-
gues that we can use Peirce’s philosophical framework to deny the skeptic’s 
premises that we do not know that we are not systematically deceived. I argue 
that Olsson’s Peircean response to the radical skeptic fails, and that a better 
Peircean response turns on the falsification of a different premise the skeptic 
embraces. The Peircean account I develop holds that, although I do not know 
whether the skeptical hypothesis is true, I sill know what I ordinarily claim to 
know. The implication is that I can retain knowledge of commonsense propo-
sitions despite the possibility of deception.
2 The Radical Skeptical Argument
The problem of radical skepticism can be posed as follows. Let S be any skepti-
cal hypothesis similar to the systematic illusion scenario. Let O be some propo-
sition I claim to know which is incompatible with S. O could be the proposition 
that I have two hands. O propositions are those nearly everyone believes which 
are often taken for granted. The radical skeptical argument is as follows:
S1. I do not know not-S.
S2. If I do not know not-S, then I do not know O.
S3. So, I do not know O.
The argument is valid and S1 and S2 seem true. S1 appears true because I have 
no evidence for or against the possibility that all my experiences are artificially 
generated. S2 appears true because if I know that I have two hands, for ex-
ample, I know that I am not being deceived about whether I have two hands. If 
I do not know whether I am being deceived, however, I do not know I have two 
hands. S3 follows: I do not know I have two hands.
3 Olsson’s First Peircean Response
Olsson treats Peirce’s response to skepticism in two places and construes the 
skeptical argument differently in each. In Against Coherence (2005b), he adds 
the following premise to the argument:
S4. If I do not know O, then I should stop believing O.
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From S3 and S4 he derives:
S5. I should stop believing O.
From S1, S2, and S4, Olsson concludes that I should stop believing I have two 
hands. This reasoning applies to any of my ordinary beliefs. Hence,
uc. I should give up all my present beliefs.
uc is the “uncertainty consequence” of the skeptical argument. According to 
Olsson, Peirce shows that when an inquirer is confronted with the skeptical ar-
gument, she has no reason to doubt that she is not deceived, and can therefore 
remain committed to her commonsense beliefs. The falsity of S1 then follows 
by S4. S4 entails that if I need not stop believing that I am not deceived, I know 
that I am not deceived.
Let us grant Olsson’s reading of Peirce and instead examine the plausibility 
of S4. The adequacy of Olsson’s response turns on attributing S4 to the skeptic. 
Olsson maintains that the skeptic is committed to S4 for the following two rea-
sons. First, it is commonsensical. It would be strange to agree that you do not 
know where you parked your car, for instance, while holding onto your belief 
that you parked it behind the market. Second, the importance of the skeptical 
argument is not merely to suggest that we do not know many of the things 
we think we know, but rather to have us give up beliefs we do not know. Thus, 
Olsson believes that the importance of the argument lies in uc, which is not 
forthcoming unless S4 is added to the skeptic’s premises. Without S4, radical 
skepticism becomes what Olsson calls “an empty exercise without any clear 
bearing on human inquiry” (Olsson 2005b, 177).
However, it seems reasonable to suppose that the skeptic would reject S4. 
First, it is not always the case that one should relinquish believing what one 
does not know. We often have very good reason to believe something despite 
not knowing it. For example, astronomers currently do not genuinely know 
whether dark matter exists. But this does not mean the scientific community 
should simply abandon such a belief. Otherwise anomalous gravitational ef-
fects have lead astronomers to posit dark matter with confidence. Other exam-
ples are easy to find. Olsson claims the skeptical argument is “empty,” by which 
he seems to mean purposeless, if it has no practical consequences. Yet, the sur-
prising conclusion that I do not know I have two hands is not purposeless. Its 
purpose is epistemic, not practical. The conclusion that we do not know many 
things we normally claim to know has purchase in challenging the justification 
of our beliefs, whether we make the further decision that those beliefs are no 
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longer suitable for guiding our actions. The importance of the skeptical argu-
ment is not found in necessitating that we discard beliefs we do not know, but 
in undermining our reasons for holding ordinary beliefs. These considerations 
suggest that the skeptic would deny S4. The radical skeptical argument, then, 
remains standing.
4 Olsson’s Second Peircean Response
In “Not Giving the Skeptic a Hearing: ‘Pragmatism and Radical Doubt’” (2005a), 
Olsson uses Peircean insights to challenge the original skeptical argument. 
Peirce suggests that we know we are not systematically deceived. That is, S1 is 
false. Olsson reconstructs the argument as follows.
First, Peirce identifies knowledge with true belief.2 Although this may 
seem controversial, the view finds support in contemporary epistemology.3 
On Peirce’s account, when one settles on a certain belief there is often no dif-
ference between belief and true belief. Inquirers cannot both believe O and 
doubt O is true. Moreover, believing O may be legitimate even if the believer 
does not possess immediate justification for O. For example, there may simply 
be no good reason available for doubting the belief.
Next, Peirce observes that we begin philosophical inquiry with beliefs we 
already hold: “[T]here is but one state of mind from which you can ‘set out’, 
namely, the very state of mind in which you actually find yourself at the time 
you do ‘set out’—a state of mind in which you are laden with an immense 
mass of cognition already formed” (1905a, 167). One belief I hold when I begin 
inquiry is that I am not systematically deceived about having two hands. Peirce 
suggests that confronting the radical skeptical argument does not motivate me 
to doubt beliefs I hold when I begin inquiry. The reasoning seems to go as fol-
lows. If I come to doubt O, it is because I have discovered something surprising 
about O.4 To discover something surprising about O is to have an experience 
that suggests not-O.5 If I come to doubt I have two hands, I must have had the 
surprising experience of not having two hands. Peirce suggests that we are not 
surprised by the radical skeptical hypothesis. After all, on that scenario our 
lived experiences are indistinguishable from the experiences we would have 
if we were systematically deceived. Consequentially, the skeptical argument 
2 See Peirce (1905a, 170, 10), (1877, 11).
3 See Sartwell (1991), (1992); Goldman (1999); Hetherington (2001).
4 Peirce (1905b, 484).
5 Peirce (1905c, 299).
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does not get me to doubt beliefs I hold when I begin inquiry. This means I 
know that I have two hands, and therefore I know that I am not systematically 
deceived. Hence, S1 is false.
There is reason to doubt this Peircean response, however. Olsson targets S1, 
which holds that I do not know I am not systematically deceived. The skeptic 
justifies this premise by claiming that I have no evidence for or against the pos-
sibility of being deceived. My lived experiences are perfectly consistent with 
the hypothetical scenario that those experiences are illusions. Importantly, 
then, the justification of S1 does not rest on the hypothetical scenario being 
true. If it did, we could falsify S1 by showing that our ordinary beliefs are true. 
That is Olsson’s Peircean reply. He relies on an understanding of knowledge 
that renders the justification of ordinary beliefs inessential for knowledge. 
However, the skeptic warrants S1 by purporting to undermine our reasons for 
holding ordinary beliefs. Since Olsson’s Peircean account takes knowledge to 
be mere true belief, Olsson fails to find an adequate response to the skeptic.
5 A New Peircean Response
A better Peircean response could be to deny S2, the claim that if I do not know 
that I am not systematically deceived, then I do not know what I ordinarily 
claim to know.6 Contemporary debate about S2 focuses on exploring the epis-
temic closure principle. Alternatively, I suggest that we can use Peirce’s insights 
to challenge directly the truth of the conditional. As I see things, the Peircean 
should say it is true that I do not know that I am not systematically deceived, 
but this does not undermine my knowledge of propositions I ordinarily claim 
to know. Let us take a closer look at this.
Take first the truth of the antecedent. When the skeptic reports that I do 
not know that I am not being deceived, it is because I have no justification 
for claiming that I am not deceived. The epistemic context of the skeptical 
scenario requires reasons for belief. In this context, the possibility of error un-
dermines the warrant of our ordinary beliefs. Insofar as the skeptic claims that 
knowledge is true justified belief, then, the Peircean should accept that the 
skeptical context truly undermines knowledge of ordinary beliefs.
Now turn to the falsity of the consequent. Despite not knowing that I am 
being deceived, the Peircean claims, I still know that I have two hands. There 
is a contextual difference between the skeptical error-possibility and ordinary 
 error-possibilities. I know that I have two hands because the everyday epistemic 
6 According to Olsson, Peirce leaves the skeptic’s premise S2 “untouched” (2005b, 200).
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context—the context in which I act on a daily basis—does not require me 
to justify my beliefs against the possibility of wholesale deception. For Peirce 
beliefs establish rules of action that guide behavior. For example, if I believe 
there is a table in front of me, I may sit on it; and if I do not have such a belief, 
I would not attempt to sit. Beliefs can be called into question by doubt. Doubt 
is not mere disbelief, according to Peirce, but a state that suspends one’s ability 
to act on the belief in question. Doubt arises when we discover information 
contrary to what we currently believe. For Peirce the aim of inquiry is to seek 
out new information that will settle conflicts of belief. We must find reason to 
reject, modify, or bolster beliefs called into doubt.
If Peirce’s view of inquiry is plausible, there is reason to think that we need 
not justify our beliefs in the face of the skeptical challenge. The skeptical sce-
nario does not induce a state where we suspend acting on our ordinary beliefs 
such that we are required to reject, alter, or further support those beliefs. To in-
duce such a state of doubt, the skeptic would have to present information that 
could serve as evidence for the skeptical proposal. But the skeptical hypothesis 
appears warranted because there seems to be no such evidence. By hypothesis, 
lived experiences are symmetrical with artificial ones. One might think that 
encountering the skeptical hypothesis itself will motivate doubt. But this can-
not be right. The skeptical hypothesis is a mere logical possibility, and logical 
possibility alone does not appear to be a sufficient reason to suspend action. 
For Peirce, then, the context in which we act out our lives does not require us to 
warrant beliefs against the skeptic. In the practical context, I know I have two 
hands. Thus, S2 is false.
6 Avoiding Two Problems with Contextualism
How does my Peircean response to radical skepticism compare to the tradi-
tional contextualist response? The traditional contextualist holds that we 
have knowledge of commonsense propositions in everyday contexts, but not 
in contexts in which radical skeptical worries about error have been raised. 
The contextualist claims that skepticism is compelling under the conditions of 
philosophical reflection, but not in everyday life. The Peircean response I ad-
vance avoids two major difficulties with the traditional contextualist response.
The first difficulty that confronts traditional contextualism is that it must 
provide an account of what constitutes a change in epistemic contexts. Impor-
tantly, my account sweeps away the problem. The Peircean is not required to 
give an explanation of a shift in epistemic contexts. In all contexts, the Peircean 
will accept that we cannot justify that we are not systematically deceived, but 
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add that such justification does threaten our knowledge of ordinary proposi-
tions. The worry about context change only holds for accounts that attempt to 
falsify S1. The contextualist claims that S1 tacitly assumes that two contexts of 
knowledge, one high and one low, determine whether one is being deceived, 
such that we have knowledge of propositions in low standards contexts, like 
the corner store, but not in more demanding contexts, like the philosophy 
classroom. The problem for the contextualist is that the skeptic holds that even 
in low standards contexts ordinary knowledge claims are false—that we have 
no knowledge tout court. Targeting S2 sidesteps this difficulty. For Peirce we act 
out our lives in both low and high standards contexts. Neither context turns 
over to the skeptic.
The second problem with traditional contextualism is that it arguably le-
gitimizes the concern that the skeptic’s standards are the best ones, and so 
we lack knowledge after all. The philosophical context appears to be the more 
demanding and rigorous one, not the everyday one. The skeptic seems to be 
using a more precise and correct standard for assessing knowledge claims. My 
Peircean response to this worry is that the division between the context that 
knowledge requires justification and the context that knowledge requires mere 
true belief does not legitimize the skeptical context as the correct one. The fact 
that the skeptical hypothesis undermines the justification of our beliefs is it-
self no reason to give that context the upper hand. The Peircean would argue 
that, if anything, the fact that the hypothetical skeptical scenario provides no 
reason for altering our behavior undercuts its legitimacy as the preferred con-
text. Assuming that our beliefs function to guide inquiry, the skeptical error-
possibility has no affect on our beliefs.
7 Conclusion
Let me take stock and conclude. I first challenged Olsson’s responses to the 
radical skeptic. In one case, he claims the skeptic should hold a premise that, 
on my view, the skeptic should deny. In another case, he fails to see that Peirce’s 
view that knowledge is mere true belief will not faze the skeptic who holds that 
the hypothetical scenario undermines our reasons for belief. Olsson’s mistake 
is to use Peirce to falsify S1. However, the Peircean should falsify S2. There is 
indeed no justifying our beliefs against the possibility of deception. But knowl-
edge in the context in which we act does not require such justification: reasons 
are crucial only when presented evidence that counters our beliefs, and the skep-
tical argument does not provide such evidence. This response has advantages 
over two common problems with the traditional contextualist response. First, 
Remhof
contemporary pragmatism 15 (2018) 15-22
<UN>
22
it  eschews having to explain what constitutes a change from everyday to skep-
tical epistemic contexts. Second, it does not suggest that the skeptical context 
is the correct one. For these reasons, I think the Peircean account developed 
here provides a strong response to the radical skeptic.
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